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DEFAMATION-LIBEL PER QUOD
Defamation-Libel Per Quod and Special Damage
In Hinsdale v. Orange County Publications, Inc.,' the libelous
publication read as follows: "Mr. and Mrs. Paul M. Hinsdale ...
announce the engagement of their son Robert W., to Concetta Kay
Reiber... ." As it was not mentioned that both plaintiff Hinsdale
and Mrs. Rieber were already married to others, the defamatory
imputation was only conveyed to readers with knowledge of the
facts. The complaints set forth this extrinsic matter but, because
no special damage was alleged, were dismissed. The New York
Court of Appeals reversed, holding special damage unnecessary as
the complaints sufficiently set forth a publication which was libelous
per se.
The rule of libel per quod, which the lower courts sought to
apply, requires allegation and proof of special damage where a writ-
ten publication, innocent on its face, is rendered libelous by virtue
of extrinsic fact.2 Such a rule is a stranger to orthodox common
law where there is no necessity to plead special damage in any libel
action, general damage to reputation being presumed.$ Libel per se
meant actionable per se. It was misinterpretation of the term libel
per se to mean libel on its face that led to the development of the
per quod rule.4
It is where the defamatory meaning of the libel is dependent on
extrinsic facts that the rule applies.5 Two other situations may arise.
First, where the publication is defamatory on its face but makes
'17 N.Y.2d 284, 217 N.E.2d 650, 270 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1966).
'See Ilitzky v. Goodman, 57 Ariz. 216, 112 P.2d 860 (1941); Karrigan
v. Valentine, 184 Kan. 783, 339 P.2d 52 (1959); Campbell v. Post Publish-
ing Co., 94 Mont. 12, 20 P.2d 1063 (1933); Ellsworth v. Martindale-Hub-
bell Law Directory, Inc., 66 N.D. 578, 268 N.W. 400 (1936).
' See Peck v. Chicago Tribune Co., 214 U.S. 185 (1909) ; Herrmann v.
Newark Morning Ledger Co., 48 N.J. Super. 420, 138 A.2d 61 (1958);
Kindley v. Privette, 241 N.C. 140, 84 S.E.2d 660 (1954); Roth v. Greens-
boro News Co., 217 N.C. 13, 6 S.E.2d 882 (1940); Youssoupoff v. Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures, 50 T.L.R. 581 (C.A. 1934); Thorley v. Lord
Kerry, 4 Taunt. 355, 128 Eng. Rep. 367 (C.P. 1812).
'For treatment of the development of the rule see Carpenter, Libel Per
Se in California and Some Other States, 17 So. CAL. L. Rxv. 347 (1944);
Henn, "Libel-By-Extrinsic-Fact," 47 CoRxELL L.Q. 14 (1962); Comment,
27 FORDHAM L. REv. 405 (1959); Note, 13 VAND. L. REv. 730 (1960).
'In this situation the plaintiff must set out these extrinsic facts in the
part of the complaint called the inducement. Its function is to render action-
able language which, when standing alone, does not appear injurious of the
plaintiff. See PROSSER, TO RTS § 106 (3d ed. 1964); TowNsHEND, SLANDER
AND LIBEL §§ 308-15 (2d ed. 1872).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
no specific reference to the plaintiff,' and, second, where the publica-
tion is capable of both an innocent and a defamatory meaning.7
While some courts have required special damage in these two areas,
the per quod rule is properly limited to the extrinsic fact situation.8
The rule has received much support in American courts. Dean
Prosser,10 though not undisputed in his claim," asserts that it is
now the majority rule and has recommended that the restatement
be changed to reflect this.'" The suggested new section 569 would
' In this situation the plaintiff would have to set forth, by way of the
colloquium, that the language was written of and concerning him. See
PROSSER, TORTS § 106 (3d ed. 1964); TOWNSHEND, SLANDER AND LIBEL
§§ 316-23 (2d ed. 1872).
" The office of the innuendo is to explain the words in light of the facts
and show their defamatory meaning. It is argumentative rather than fac-
tual, and cannot be used to introduce new matter, enlarge the sense of the
words, or impute to them an unwarranted meaning. See PROSSER, TORTS
§ 106 (3d ed. 1964); TOWNSHEND, SLANDER AND LIBEL §§ 335-44 (2d ed.
1872).
ee Brayton v. Crowell-Collier Publishing Co., 205 F.2d 644 (2d Cir.
1953); MacLeod v. Tribune Publishing Co., 52 Cal. 2d 536, 343 P.2d 36
(1959); Klein v. Sunbeam Corp., 47 Del. 526, 94 A.2d 385 (1952); Everett
v. Gross, 22 App. Div. 2d 257, 254 N.Y.S.2d 561 (1964); Marr v. Putnam,
196 Ore. 1, 246 P.2d 509 (1952); RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS §
569(1) (a) and comment e (Tent. Draft No. 12, 1966). A publication that
needs an inducement is completely innocent on its face, while in the other
two situations this degree of innocence is lacking. Where an innuendo is
needed, there is a defamatory meaning on the face of the publication. In
the colloquium situation the publication is defamatory of some person on
its face. This distinction justifies the application of the rule to the induce-
ment situation alone.
' The position North Carolina would take on this question is uncertain.
In Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 212 N.C. 780, 195 S.E. 55 (1938) the
court accepted as established law the rule requiring special damage in libel
per quod situations. Seventeen years later the court, in Kindley v. Privette,
241 N.C. 140, 84 S.E.2d 660 (1954), refuted the special damage rule, de-
cided the issue in accord with traditional common law principles, and cited
old Restatement section 569 with approval. The court also went on to say,
241 N.C. at 144, 84 S.E.2d at 663, that whenever the court used the term
libel per se it did so with the meaning actionable per se, not libelous on its
face. In Badame v. Lampke, 242 N.C. 755, 89 S.E.2d 466 (1955), a slander
case, the court stated the libel per quod rule again and seemed to indicate
it applied to slander. For a full discussion of the rule in North Carolina
see North Carolina Case Law-Torts, 35 N.C.L. REv. 177, 256 (1957);
Note, 33 N.C.L. REv. 674 (1955).
10 PROSSER, TORTS § 170 (3d ed. 1964) ; Prosser, Libel Per Quod, 46 VA.
L. REv. 839 (1960); Prosser, More Libel Per Quod, 79 HARv. L. REv.
1629 (1966).
" Eldredge, The Spurious Rule of Libel Per Quod, 79 HARV. L. REv.
733 (1966).
'2 The present section reads:§ 569 LIABILITY WITHOUT PROOF OF SPECIAL HARM, WHEN IMPOSED
-LIBEL.
One who falsely, and without a privilege to do so, publishes matter
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require special damage where the libel is dependent on extrinsic
facts and does not fall within one of the four classes of slander per
se.1" This assimilation of libel with slander1 4 is necessary to avoid
a result that would violate the maxim that what is actionable as
slander is, a fortiori, actionable as libel.' 5
In New York the rule found its origins in O'Connell v. Press
Publishing Co."0 There the court, in unsupported dictum,'17 stated
as well established law the rule of libel per quod. The lower New
defamatory to another in such a manner as to make the publication a
libel is liable to the other although no special harm or loss of reputa-
tion results therefrom.
RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 569 (1938).
The proposed new section would read:
§ 569 LIABILITY WITHOUT PROOF OF SPECIAL HARM
(1) One who publishes defamatory matter is subject to liability
without proof of special harm or loss of reputation if the defamation
is (a) libel whose defamatory innuendo is apparent from the publi-
cation itself without reference to extrinsic facts by way of
inducement, or
(b) libel or slander which imputes to another(i) a criminal offense, as stated in § 571
(ii) a loathsome disease, as stated in § 572
(iii) matter incompatible with his business, trade, profession
or office, as stated in § 573, or(iv) unchastity on the part of a woman plaintiff, as stated in
§ 574.(2) One who publishes any other defamation is subject to liabil-
ity only upon proof of special harm, as stated in § 575.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS § 569 (Tent. Draft No. 12, 1966).
" This proposed change caused much controversy at the last two annual
meetings of the American Law Institute. Dean Prosser, whose arguments
to the Institute in favor of the change were published in Prosser, More Libel
Per Quod, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1629 (1966), met with vigorous opposition.
Laurence H. Eldredge, a member of the Philadelphia Bar, prepared an
exhaustive brief in which he concludes that the vast majority still adhere to
the traditional common law rule. The Eldredge brief has also been pub-
lished, Eldredge, The Spurious Ride of Libel Per Quod, 79 HARv. L. REv.
733 (1966).
J'At common law special damage is required for slander where it is
not within one of the arbitrary classes of slander per se. These classes are
imputations of (1) a criminal offense, (2) a loathsome disease, (3) matter
incompatible with a person's business, trade or profession; or (4) unchastity
on the part of a woman. See PRossER, TORTS § 107 (3d ed. 1964).
" [T]o require special damage in all 'libel-by-extrinsic-fact' cases,
including those involving imputations of serious crime, loathsome
disease, unfitness for one's calling, or unchastity, violates the maxim
that any communication which is actionable if so published as to be
classifiable as slander is, a fortiori, actionable if so published as to be
classifiable as libel.
Henn, Libel-By-Extrizsic-Fact, 47 CORNELL L.Q. 14, 49 (1962).
"6214 N.Y. 352, 108 N.E. 556 (1915).
"Henn, "Libel-By-Extrinsic-Fact" 47 CORNELL L.Q. 14, 34 (1962).
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York courts have tended to follow this rule and dismiss the complaint
if special damage was not alleged. 8 The Court of Appeals, deciding
the question six times"9 other than in Hinsdale, never dismissed
a complaint. These six decisions, consistent with Prosser's formu-
lation of the rule,2" expand the O'Connell rule so that special damage
is required only where the publication is innocent on its face and
not within one of the classes of slander per se. Hinsdale, which
cannot be reconciled with the suggested restatement rule, distin-
guishes O'Connell on the basis that it dealt with the improper use
of an innuendo, and does not control cases which involve the plead-
ing of extrinsic fact.2 ' From this it would seem that the court is
saying there never was a requirement that special damage be alleged,
and that libel per quod cases are to be decided in line with the
orthodox common law rule. Such a holding fails to consider the
many contrary cases 22 in the lower New York courts. If the Hins-
dale court intended to overrule these cases it should have so stated
in clear terms.
Other language in the opinion indicates that the rule in the
O'Connell case is not overruled but merely further expanded. The
court cites two post O'Connell decisions 23 as applying "the reason-
able, common-sense idea that a fact not expressed in the newspaper
but presumably known to its readers is part of the libel."'  This
seems to indicate that the per quod rule now requires special damage
8 See Everett v. Gross, 22 App. Div. 2d 257, 254 N.Y.S.2d 561 (1964);
Kuhn v. Veloz, 252 App. Div. 515, 299 N.Y.S. 924 (1937); Macri v. Mayer,
22 Misc. 2d 429, 201 N.Y.S.2d 525 (Sup. Ct. 1960); Solotaire v. Cowles
Magazines, Inc., 107 N.Y.S.2d 798 (Sup. Ct. 1951); Legion Against Vivi-
section v. Gray, 63 N.Y.S.2d 920 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
19Balabanoff v. Hearst Consol. Publications, Inc., 294 N.Y. 351, 62
N.E.2d 599 (1945); Henry v. New York Post, Inc., 280 N.Y. 842, 21
N.E.2d 887 (1939); Braun v. Armour & Co., 254 N.Y. 514, 173 N.E. 845(1930); Ben-Oliel v. Press Publishing Co., 251 N.Y. 250, 167 N.E. 432
(1929); Sydney v. MacFadden Newspaper Publishing Corp., 242 N.Y. 208,
151 N.E. 209 (1926) ; Smith v. Smith, 236 N.Y. 581, 142 N.E. 292 (1923).
" Five of these cases involve imputations that come within one of the
classes of slander per se and would not require special damages under the
new restatement section. The sixth case can be viewed as being libelous on
its face. See Henn, "Libel-By-Extrinsic-Fact," 47 CORNELL L.Q. 14, 34
(1962).
(1 17 N.Y.2d at -, 217 N.E.2d at 653-54, 270 N.Y.S.2d at 598.
-' See cases cited note 14 supra.
Balabanoff v. Hearst Consol. Publications, Inc., 294 N.Y. 351, 62
N.E.2d 599 (1945); Sydney v. MacFadden Newspaper Publishing Corp.,
242 N.Y. 208, 151 N.E. 209 (1926).
"117 N.Y.2d at -, 217 N.E.2d at 653, 270 N.Y.S.2d at 597.
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only where the extrinsic facts are presumably unknown to the read-
ership. The court stresses the fact that plaintiffs worked in the
same office and lived in the same lightly populated area, thus under-
lining the probability that the readers readily understood the de-
famatory imputation.
One of the arguments in favor of the special damage rule is that
the extrinsic facts will be known to relatively few people and, there-
fore, the publication is less likely to cause damage. 5 While this
may be true in some cases it can easily be shown that in others the
facts will be generally known throughout the community." This
weakness in the per quod rule could be eliminated by the "reader-
ship" test suggested in Hinsdale. Special damage would only be
required where the extrinsic facts are not likely to be known to the
public-where there is in actuality a much reduced possibility of
harm. If the facts are likely to be known to the readership then
they would be part of the libel and the case treated as actionable
per se.
Another aspect of Hinsdale, although not considered by the
court, is that the complaints alleged defendant knew or should have
known the extrinsic facts and, hence, the defamatory imputation
conveyed. At common law strict liability is imposed for defama-
tion.17 As one of the reasons for the special damage rule is to
"The extrinsic facts "may be expected to be known to relatively few
people, and not to reach the general public with the newspaper." PROSSER,
TORTS § 107, at 782 (3d ed. 1964).
" It is obvious that [the traditional common law] point of view is
the one consistent with good sense since the harmful impact of a libel
upon its victim is not less in the particular instance where its odious
meaning requires resort to extrinsic facts which are known to the
recipient of the libel.
Herrmann v. Newark Morning Ledger Co., 48 N.J. Super. 420, 444, 138
A.2d 61, 74 (1958).
"
7Liability for defamation does not depend on intention to defame the
plaintiff, but on the fact of defamation. All that is required is that reason-
able people would believe the publication defamatory of the plaintiff. See
Washington Post v. Kennedy, 55 App. D.C. 162, 3 F.2d 207 (1924) ; Corri-
gan v. Bobbs-Merrill Co., 228 N.Y. 58, 126 N.E. 260 (1920); Cassidy v.
Daily Mirror, [1929] 2 K.B. 331; Jones v. Hulton & Co., [1909] 2 K.B.
444, aff'd [1910] A.C. 20; Morrison v. Ritchie & Co., 39 Scot L.R. 432(1902); The classic statement is "whenever a man publishes he publishes
at his peril." King v. Woodfall, Lofft 776, 781, 98 Eng. Rep. 914, 916(K.B. 1774). Minimal fault is required in defamation. Defendant is not
liable unless the communication of the defamatory matter to a third person
was through intent or negligence. See Western Union Tel. Co. v. Lesesne,
198 F.2d 154 (4th Cir. 1952); Hedgpeth v. Coleman, 183 N.C. 309, 111
S.E. 517 (1922); Wilcox v. Moon, 64 Vt. 450, 24 Atl. 244 (1892); Mc-
Nichol v. Grandy, [1931] Can. Sup. Ct. 696.
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protect publishers from liability where the publication gives no indi-
cation of its defamatory nature and defendant knows of no facts
which will make it so,2" the injection of the fault concept would
seem reasonable. Earlier cases2" have held that where the publica-
tion was innocent on its face, defendant must be shown to have
known or be negligent in not knowing the extrinsic facts before
there can be any recovery. It would seem unreasonable to require
plaintiff to prove special damage where the publication was defama-
tory through negligence or intent. It is suggested that plaintiff
should be limited to special damage only where there is no fault and
the publication is innocent on its face.
The per quod rule and the suggested alternatives are founded on
the concept of special damage. The application of this concept in
the area of defamation begs the ultimate question of what is the
nature of the injury. The gravamen of the action is injury to the
plaintiff's reputation.30 Hence, the requirement of an allegation of
pecuniary damage in order to recover for defamation seems anoma-
lous. There is no logical reason for requiring special damage where
a slanderous statement is not within one of the classes of slander
per se. Such a rule should not be perpetuated by applying it to
libel even in the limited area of libel per quod.3 1 Furthermore, this
"The purpose of the rule requiring proof of special damages when
the defamatory meaning does not appear on the face of the language
used is to protect publishers who make statements innocent in them-
selves that are defamatory only because of extrinsic facts known to
the reader.... In such a case, general damages for loss of reputation
may be trivial, and the paper's mistake innocent, for the content of
the report would not alert it to the possibility of defamation.
MacLeod v. Tribune Publishing Co., 52 Cal. 2d 536, 550, 343 P.2d 36, 43-44
(1959).
"o Jones v. R.L. Polk & Co., 190 Ala. 243, 67 So. 577 (1915) (defendant
must know or be negligent in not knowing the extrinsic facts); Caldwell
v. Raymond, 2 Abb. Pr. 193 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1855) (plaintiff should have
averred that defendant knew the extrinsic facts).
0 See PROSSER, TORTS § 106 (3d ed. 1964) ; Green, Relational Interests,
31 ILL. L. REv. 35 (1936).
" In Hinkle v. Alexander, - Ore. -, 417 P.2d 586 (1966) the Oregon
court considered the arguments on both sides of the proposed Restatement
change and, in deciding against the change and overruling previous per
quod decisions, concluded:
We are not so much concerned about which of the opposing rules
has the actual support of a majority of the courts. Our prime concern
is which rule is the better, more workable and less confusing. We
conclude that the Restatement rule is to be preferred and adhere to
it .... [I]mposing the restrictions of the law of slander on to that
of libel has added consfusion to confusion and produces . . . absurd
results. ...
[Vol. 45
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burden of proof gives excessive immunity to publishers 2 and de-
stroys the vindicatory function of the action.s 3 The per quod rule
does not promote unity in the law of defamation but creates further
disunity as the foundations for it in slander (the arbitrary class test)
and in libel (the extrinsic fact test) rest on completely different
concepts.
One possible solution would be to relax the requirements for
snowing special damage. The courts in Kansas"4 no longer insist
upon a showing of specific pecuniary loss, and hold the requirement
is met if there are allegations of some actual damage resulting from
the defamation. Plaintiff, while not benefited by the presumption
of general damage, is allowed to recover on a showing that he was
in fact harmed.
Perhaps the best solution to the problem is a retraction statute
similar to the English Defamation Act.35 Under this act if the
words are not defamatory on their face and the publisher is with-
out fault, he is absolved of liability by a retraction. If the terms of
- Ore. at -, 417 P.2d at 589.
The concurring opinion in this case went on to say:
The court . . . is fully warranted in its conclusion that the per
quod rule is an erroneous introduction into the law of libel of a rule
peculiar to slander, is illogical, and is more likely than not to lead to
denials of justice.
- Ore. at -, 417 P.2d at 591.
" To require proof of pecuniary damages in such cases as a basis for
a cause of action would be to emasculate the action without rational
justification. It has well been stated of such a requirement: "There
is no rhyme nor reason to this rule. Yet courts often resort to it,
thus adding one more meaningless rule to the hopeless confusion of
libel and slander law."
Herrmann v. Newark Morning Ledger Co., 48 N.J. Super, 420, 444, 138
A.2d 61, 74 (1958) citing Cowan, Torts, 9 RUTGERS L. Rnv. 157, 172 (1954).
" "The great function of an action of libel, to provide public vindication
of the decent citizen's good name, is completely wiped out in a great number
of cases by requiring such proof." Eldredge, The Spurious Rule of Libel
Per Quod, 79 HARv. L. REv. 733, 756 (1966).
" See Karrigan v. Valentine, 184 Kan. 783, 339 P.2d 52 (1959);
Koerner v. Lawler, 180 Kan. 318, 304 P.2d 926 (1956).
"Defamation Act, 1952, 15 & 16 Geo. 6 & 1 Eliz. 2, c. 66, § 4. The
North Carolina retraction statute provides that where the article was pub-
lished in good faith and there were reasonable grounds for belief that the
statement was true, recovery is limited to actual damages. N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 99-2 (1965). The court equated the term actual damages with the general
damages presumed at common law. The effect of compliance therefore is
merely to eliminate the possibility of punitive damages. See Lay v. Gazette
Publishing Co., 209 N.C. 134, 183 S.E. 416 (1936); Pentuff v. Park, 194
N.C. 146, 138 S.E. 616 (1927); Osborn v. Leach, 135 N.C. 628, 47 S.E. 811
(1904).
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the statute are not met the defendant's liability is the same as at
common law, with general damage to reputation presumed. The
practical result of this statute is similar to the result under the per
quod rule, i.e., it is only in the exceptional cases that money damages
will be recovered. The major difference is that with the statute the
plaintiff's name would be cleared and the vindicatory function of
the action served.
REED JOHNSTON, JR.
Eminent Domain-Agriculture-Evidence--Just Compensation
for Allotment Bearing Land
The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 and its subsequent
amendments provide a complex scheme for the regulation of the
production of certain agricultural commodities.1 Under the act, the
Secretary of Agriculture determines what acreage requirements of
each commodity will be required by the nation. This overall require-
ment is then apportioned by states, counties, and farms. Local com-
mittees at the county level apportion the allotment among the farms
on which the commodity has been produced. The basis for the
apportionment is the commodity production history of each farm,
taking into consideration past production of the commodity, suit-
ability of the land, available equipment for production, crop rota-
tion practices, and other physical factors that affect the production
of the commodity.'
It is through this generally outlined statutory scheme that a
farm's eligibility and attainment of an acreage allotment for a spe-
cific commodity is determined.
The receipt of an allotment is noticeably self-perpetuating for
the basis for award is heavily weighed on the commodity productive
history and the suitability of the individual farm.3 The allotment
is made to the farm itself and not to the person who operates or
owns the farm and, therefore, runs with the land.' The act does
' E.g., Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 [hereinafter cited as Act of
1938], §§ 311-15, 52 Stat. 31 (1938), as amended, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1311-15 (1964),
as amended, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1313(j)-14 (Supp. I, 1965). These commodities
are: tobacco, cotton, corn, wheat, rice, and peanuts.
'E.g., Act of 1938, § 313, added by 52 Stat. 47 (1938), as amended, 7
U.S.C. § 1313(b) (1964).
'Ibid.
'See Chandler v. Davis, 350 F.2d 669 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382
[Vol. 45
